This week, both the internal-grade and coking-grade ammonium sulfate prices have seen significant reductions, with declines typically ranging from 50 to 120 yuan/ton. From the supply side, most internal-grade production facilities have maintained operations, while coking enterprises in certain regions have faced environmental control measures and restrictions on vehicle types for transportation, resulting in a reduction or suspension of some bidding quantities. Overall, the supply capacity has remained relatively stable. Regarding demand, international export volumes have decreased, and due to higher domestic prices, end-buyer negotiation progress has slowed. The alignment of upstream and downstream prices has been challenging. Meanwhile, domestic demand primarily comes from granular factories and essential industrial and agricultural purchases. In particular, due to the increased agricultural demand in the Northeast region, the demand for internal-grade ammonium sulfate has risen, providing some support for the market. However, the price of coking-grade ammonium sulfate has seen a significant decline. Overall, the market’s trading atmosphere remains weak, and export demand is currently limited. International buyers are hesitant to accept current prices, and there is a strong sentiment among industry professionals that the short-term trend is bearish. It is expected that the ammonium sulfate market will continue to perform weakly in the coming week, with prices likely to decline further, albeit at a slower pace. ~ Recent bidding for Indian urea has driven up international urea prices, injecting stability into the market and potentially slowing the decline in ammonium sulfate prices. Keep a close eye on end-demand trends.
One of the biggest headlines from the potash sector in 2025 was Nutrien Ltd.’s decision to forego an opportunity to build a potash export terminal in Canada, while going ahead with the decision to invest in a new potash terminal in Longview, Washington, USA.
The decision was very controversial in Canada. In an op-ed by Lorne Gunter in the Edmonton Journal, the decision to build a new potash terminal in the U.S. was analyzed under the backdrop of PM Carney’s MPO and other Canadian domestic politics. Lorne Gunter posed a critical question to readers about the decision: “So when Nutrien, the world’s largest potash mining company, based in Saskatoon, says it’s looking to build a new billion-dollar export terminal, don’t you think that Prime Minister Mark Carney and his vaunted Major Projects Office (MPO) would jump at the chance to help the company find a Canadian site and remove any roadblocks to the terminal’s construction?”
There are various opinions about why Nutrien has decided to abandon plans for Vancouver or Prince Rupert. One is logistical. Infrastructure investments would be needed to upgrade railroads from the potash mines in Saskatchewan to the ports on Canadian coasts. Another argument is about domestic politics in Canada. Under the “nation-building” platform, Prime Minister Carney’s government has prioritized projects that will have quick turnarounds from construction to production.
While I will not speculate on the politics around this decision, I do believe it is timely to mention that a Saskatchewan-based junior potash company, Karnalyte Resources (TSX:KRN), has emerged from the shadows of potash mining and exploration in Canada. The company has a solution mining facility near Wynyard, Saskatchewan, where it intends to develop a carnallite-sylvite mineral deposit that will produce 350,000 tons per year in a first phase, with another 600,000 tons of potash per year in the second phase, while increasing to over 1 million tons per year through advancements in the development project.
In late April 2015, the company had made a unanimous decision to write down the Wynyard Project to its salvage value, a decision which was strongly supported by Karnalyte’s independent auditors. The board also unanimously determined that it would not be possible to finance and profitably construct and operate a production facility at the Wynyard Project due to the price environment for potash and magnesium in 2015.
On 13 August 2025, ten years later, the company released a statement about the strategic review, expanding into magnesium chloride production at the Wynyard Project by developing magnesium resources alongside the potash resource. The new strategy is to produce two resources—potash and magnesium—of which are both relevant to global fertilizer market trends. For example, magnesium is also a critical mineral in Canada.
In this context, Karnalyte emerged with its ambitions to carry out a new strategy for the Wynyard Project in Saskatchewan, including recent results from a NI 43-101 Technical Report, which confirmed the company’s plans to produce a total amount of potash at 142.2-million tons, or 2.175-million tons per year, in addition to 7 million tons of hydromagnesite.
One of the most important aspects of the Wynyard Project is that it already has an influential offtake agreement from India’s Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals (GSFC). Moreover, both fertilizer resources have the attention of the U.S. market, particularly magnesium sulfate (SOPM), also known as langbeinite. Karnalyte is one of the few companies that has an advantage in producing SOPM from the resource base in Saskatchewan. SOPM will be an important part of the company’s strategy to sell fertilizer to U.S. farmers in the Corn Belt.
Canpotex CEO Gordon McKenzie recently wrote about potash supply chains in The Hill Times. Under the backdrop of U.S. tariffs, McKenzie pointed out that Canada’s potash supply chain vulnerabilities are an internal problem for exporters. This is why Karnalyte’s dual-market strategy, targeting both U.S. and India for its potash and magnesium fertilizers, will complement the diversification strategy for potash exports from Canada. The supply and demand of potash reveals that food security comes at a price, so Canadian potash producers should look for growth markets where long term value supersedes uncertainty.
Open-Air Sulfur Storage: Risks and Quality Issues – Insights from Kashagan, Kazakhstan
The Kashagan project faced a potential $4.2-4.4 billion fine over excessive open-air sulfur storage at Bolashak. NCOC (Eni, Shell, ExxonMobil, TotalEnergies, etc.) disputed it, claiming compliance.
In August 2025, an appellate court overturned the fine due to procedural flaws. The government addressed issues and pushed forward, but as of December 2025, the case remains unresolved with ongoing tensions.
Key risks of open-air storage:
Contamination: Dust, rain introduce impurities, lowering purity.
Dust loss: Particle breakdown causes product loss and pollution.
Oxidation: Generates SO₂, raising fire risk and degrading quality.
Fines & reputation: High regulatory and environmental costs.
Better approach: Enclosed storage for >99.9% purity and sustainability
Subject: Whistleblowing Aditya Birla fraudulent activity
This letter is submitted with reference to the Urea Tender issued by Indian Potash Limited on behalf of the Government of India.
We hereby place on record serious concerns regarding the participation of Aditya Birla Group in the tender. Public information confirms that a previous urea consignment supplied by this entity to a buyer in Ethiopia was rejected due to severe quality violations resulting in significant penalties.
Industry intelligence further indicates that Aditya Birla Group conduct aligns with patterns commonly associated with organised procurement malpractice, including the movement of sub-standard and rejected fertiliser cargo into India markets. Such behaviour, if occurring, poses a direct threat to India agricultural integrity, food security, and public interest.
Additionally, certain developments around the present tender raise material concerns regarding procedural transparency and oversight. While no direct allegation is made, the circumstances necessitate scrutiny for any undue influence, facilitation interests or irregular intervention by the officer of tender body, which often create an environment conducive to coordinated misconduct.
In light of these serious red flags, we urgently request an independent and comprehensive investigation into:
• the supplier’s quality compliance records and product origin,
• the integrity of the procurement process, and
• any conflicts of interest or unexplained deviations.
Should any irregularities be confirmed, we strongly urge the authority to impose the strictest administrative, contractual, and legal actions, including permanently blacklisting Aditya Birla Group from all future tenders and supplies, to safeguard the interests of the Government of India and prevent systemic exploitation.
Today, the price of sulfur at the port has been fluctuating and showing a strong upward trend. During the morning session, buyers and sellers continued to engage in price negotiations. The buyer’s inquiry price for the morning was around 3,900 yuan/ton, a tentative offer. The seller, relying on some available inventory, maintained a higher price. Another actual transaction was completed at 3,920 yuan/ton. The exact volume of current market transactions is not yet clear and requires further verification. Attention will be focused on the specifics of spot transactions in the afternoon. As of the time of writing, the reference price for granular sulfur at the Yangtze River market is 3,900-4,000 yuan/ton, up 50 yuan/ton from the previous working day’s low of 3,850 yuan.
Today, the Shandong market for liquid sulfur experienced a downward trend, with the decline amounting to 20 yuan/ton. The auctioned prices for local refineries ranged from 3,630 to 3,653 yuan/ton. Downstream industries continued to maintain their essential purchasing needs and adhere to the principle of taking in only necessary quantities. Refineries aimed at selling their products, resulting in a slight decrease in the auctioned prices. Port holders mostly remained cautious, with resource costs at high levels preventing them from making offers. The main refineries plan to adjust their prices today. We will wait for the outcome of these price adjustments. As of the end of the report, the main liquid sulfur prices in Shandong ranged from 3,630 yuan/ton to 4,140 yuan/ton. This represents a 20 yuan/ton decrease from the previous working day.
Ammonium chloride market price reference on December 19
Today, stable operation was maintained, many ammonium chloride enterprises expected to issue before implementation, high-level receipts were limited, recently the enthusiasm of downstream fertilizer enterprises and traders to take delivery has decreased compared with the previous period, and short-term prices may remain stable. Later, we need to pay attention to downstream work.
This week, the capacity utilization rate of ammonium chloride industry was 73.07%, down by 0.22% from last week, and the output was 310.7 thousand tons, down by 0.10 million tons from last week.
This week, the capacity utilization rate of waste enterprises was 39.37%, down 1.25% from last week.
At present, dry ammonium from Shandong, Henan and Hebei is delivered near reference 440-480
Dry ammonium factory prices in southwest region 420-450
Wet ammonium delivered in the Jiangsu region 340-370
Price Reference:
Zhejiang Longshan Chemical Wet Ammonium Factory 300
Lianyungang Debang Factory Dry ammonium 400 Wet ammonium 310
Kunshan, Zhongshan, Jiangsu, dry ammonium 400. Wet ammonium 300
Jiangsu Huachang Wet Ammonium Factory 300
The price for delivery within a radius of Hu bei Yihua Shuanghuan is 430-450.
Lurvy Group's factory price for wet ammonium is around 300,
Sichuan and Bongam Ammonium Output Near 480
Chongqing and Bong Alkaline Ammonium yields about 420 dry ammonium
Chongqing Xiangyu Salted Ammonium South West Delivery Price About 520
Xinghua, Shaanxi, parking for maintenance, unscheduled time for driving
Tianjin Alkaline Plant Installation Parking and Maintenance
Henan Junma Dry Ammonium Factory 410
The dry ammonium in Henan province is sent near 450-480, and the wet ammonium in the province is delivered 400-420.
Inner Mongolia Wafeng agricultural dry ammonium production plant is about 430
Anhui Red Quadrangle Dry Ammonium Output 400, Wet Ammonium Input 300
The price trend of potassium chloride today has remained strong. Imported potassium has recently arrived in significantly insufficient quantities, and the stockpile at ports has shown a slow decline. The availability of marketable supplies remains insufficient, and some traders still hold back on selling. However, given the relatively high prices, downstream acceptance is limited, and purchases are primarily driven by demand. The market is in a stalemate between supply and demand…
Currently, the domestic 60% crystal’s main market delivery prices range from 3100 to 3200. Prices vary across different regions, and individual negotiations are required for final transactions. The 57% powder delivery price is around 2950 to 3000.
Reference prices for ports:
Qingdao Port, Lianyungang Port, Yantai Port, Zhanjiang Port, Zhenjiang Port. Self-price increase: 62% white 3150-3450 (the lower end is the guidance price; available stock is limited). Prices at southern ports are higher, around 3500 yuan.
Qingdao Port, Yantai Port, large-sized red potassium 3300-3380.
Yingkou Port pick-up for 62% white potash: 3150-3420. Large-grain red potash for pick-up: 3360-3400.
Lianyungang, Weifang Port 60% Lao White Self-Pickup 3180-3280
Fangchenggang Port, Zhanjiang Port 60% red pigment. Port pickup costs around 3250-3300.
Northeastern border trade: 62% of Russian-Belarusian potash port carload prices are 3,300-3,350. Border trade port: 60% of large-sized particles are 3,220-3,250.
Currently, the stockpile of potassium chloride at ports stands around 2.4 million tons… Imports of potassium fertilizers have been limited in recent times, resulting in a slight decrease in port inventory. Additionally, the majority of the supply is still held by large importers, limiting the amount available for market distribution.
The price of potassium sulfate has continued to remain high and stable today. Manufacturers have largely maintained the prices set earlier. The supply of raw materials for Mannheim potassium sulfate manufacturers remains tight, and the price of potassium sulfate has consistently been in a situation of price inversion. There will likely be no significant relief in the short term, so most factories are still operating at reduced capacity.
Currently, the mainstream arrival prices for Guotou Luokai’s 52% powder are around 3,680-3,700 yuan per ton. The prices for Qinghai’s 50% powder at arrival points are mostly between 3,550-3,580 yuan per ton. Transactions are subject to negotiation, and prices vary among different brands. Mannheim potassium sulfate 52% powder’s mainstream factory prices are around 3,900-4,000 yuan per ton, while 50% powder’s mainstream factory prices range from 3,750-3,850 yuan. For 50% granular potassium sulfate from Northeast China, the factory prices are around 3,850-3,900 yuan. Actual transactions are subject to negotiation.
Market update: Currently, the overall supply of potassium chloride in the market remains tight, and market prices are high. Downstream factories mostly purchase only as needed, with small orders being the norm. In the short term, without any significant replenishment of potassium fertilizer supplies, and with essential demand continuing to support the market, prices are expected to remain high and stable. Continue to monitor the arrival of new imported supplies, policy-related news, and the discharge patterns of importers.
Here’s a clear and faithful English translation of your text, keeping the professional, market‑analysis tone:
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Today’s Ammonium Sulfate Market Overview:
Recently, the ammonium sulfate market has entered a downward trend. The main reason is that earlier, supply tightened, prompting raw‑material producers to hold firm on prices with a strong willingness to push them up. However, as we approach the end of the fourth quarter, the export market enters its off‑season. With weak terminal demand in both volume and price, upstream and downstream transactions have become difficult to match, and overall market activity remains weak and stagnant. After a short period of market tug‑of‑war, the market is gradually returning to rationality, with prices loosening and adjusting downward.
Price Trend:
Coking‑grade ammonium sulfate, which is sold mainly through auctions, more directly reflects market sentiment. Based on this week’s auction results, most price declines fall within the range of 20–70 RMB/ton. The price gap among downstream buyers has widened, and their acceptance of current price levels varies significantly. Aside from granular fertilizer plants and rigid industrial/agricultural demand, participation from other buyers is low, and their bids are generally weak. Many still hold a bearish outlook for the market.
Supply and Demand:
On the supply side, caprolactam units—after a coordinated reduction in operating rates earlier—are mostly running near 80%. Recently, due to the shutdown and maintenance of Yongrong Technology’s Phase I unit starting on the 18th, operating rates have further declined, with subsequent rates expected around 72.24%. Coking enterprises continue to be affected by environmental production restrictions. In some regions, regulations on new‑energy vehicle transportation have tightened, and considering shipment and logistics challenges, the supply of coking‑grade ammonium sulfate has slightly decreased. As of the close on December 19, independent coking enterprises were operating at 72.05%.
On the demand side, international exports are in the off‑season. In the domestic market, compound‑fertilizer plants are operating at around 40%. Their purchasing sentiment for ammonium sulfate has improved somewhat. Production in Northeast China is relatively stable, and purchasing is more concentrated, mainly due to increased procurement of caprolactam‑grade ammonium sulfate for winter‑storage orders. However, operating rates in Hubei, Henan, Southwest China, Jiangsu, and Anhui have declined. This is partly due to persistent environmental‑protection pressure in some regions, and partly because weak downstream sentiment has led to insufficient shipments and rising inventory pressure.
From a market‑sentiment perspective, short‑term bearishness still persists. However, attention should be paid to the urea market going forward. Reportedly, India’s NFL has issued a new round of urea import tenders, with an intended purchase volume of 1.5 million tons (800,000 tons for the west coast and 700,000 tons for the east coast). The tender closes on January 2, 2026, is valid until January 16, and the latest shipment date is February 20. It is expected that domestic ammonium sulfate will continue a rational downward trend through December. Moving into the new year, the results of India’s urea tender will be key in guiding international purchasing sentiment.
Theoretical profit of urea enterprises:
As of December 18, 2025 (51st week), the theoretical profit of Chinese urea sample enterprises: the theoretical profit of coal-based fixed-bed process is –217 yuan/ton, an increase of 12.15% over the previous week; the theoretical profit of coal-based new water-coal-slurry process is 154 yuan/ton, an increase of10.79% over the previous week; and the theoretical profit of gas-based process is –238 yuan/ton, unchanged from the previous week. The main reason is that the costs for gas-based operations remained relatively stable this week, while the increase in coal-based profits was primarily due to lower costs.
Next week, the expected profit margins for domestic urea samples are expected to be: fixed-bed process – around 210 yuan/ton, a slight increase from this week’s prices; new gasification process – 150-160 yuan/ton, with slight fluctuations from this week’s prices; gas-based process – -238 yuan/ton, with relatively stable prices compared to this week; actual theoretical profit losses are within -88 yuan/ton. The urea market has been progressing slowly based on sentiment changes recently, with fluctuations in prices and trends being relatively small. The price of urea in the next cycle may initially rise slightly before stagnating, with profit margins experiencing minor fluctuations.
Morning. Following the recent run-up in Urea values post NFL announcement, Int'l paper took a slight pause in activity y'day, while Nola saw gains late in the day with Jan paper trading low/mid-$380s. Mkts framed:
AG
Dec $388//$395
Jan $402//$410
Feb $400//$408
Mar $395//$410
Cfr Brazil
Dec $394//$408
Jan $405//$412
Feb $402//$408
Mar $395//$415
Egypt
Jan $420//$455
Feb $415//$450
Nola
Phys: Jan traded $378; Feb traded $375, $376
Paper:
Dec $355//$360
Jan $382//$386 – traded $382, $384
Feb $377/$390
Mar $377//$390
Apr $375//$387
May $365//$375
Jun $355//$365
Brazil Amsul
Dec $182/$190
Jan $178//$190
Feb $175//$188
UAN Nola
Jan $285//$310
Feb $280//$315
DAP Nola
Dec $625//645
Jan $615//$630
Feb $620//$635
Mar $620//$635
Q1 $625//$635
MAP Brazil
Jan $635//$660
Feb $645//$675
Mar $655//$680
Jul $670//$700
Chinese Ammonium Phosphate (MAP/DAP) Price Trends – December 17
Monoammonium Phosphate (MAP)
Today, the MAP market remained firm and moved upward. In Hubei, some major producers raised the new price of 55% powder to 3,850 RMB/ton, an increase of 200 RMB/ton compared with the previous level. Although spot sulfur prices have recently declined, sulfuric acid prices remain high and rising, keeping costs elevated. In addition, as large producers continue to announce new prices, sulfur futures rebounded again, providing support for both costs and new quotations. In the short term, prices are expected to remain strong at high levels, with downstream buyers purchasing as needed. Market participants should continue to monitor raw material trends and policy developments.
—
Raw Materials
1. Sulfur
• Port sulfur prices stopped falling and rebounded today. Morning inquiries from end-users increased, boosting overall trading sentiment. Quotation ranges rose from 3,950–3,990 RMB/ton to 4,000–4,010 RMB/ton.
• Despite short-term policy impacts, the core supply-demand imbalance has not been fully resolved. Afternoon focus will be on spot transactions.
• As of press time, Yangtze River market granular sulfur spot reference was 3,950–4,010 RMB/ton, up 160–200 RMB/ton from the previous working day.
• In Shandong, the liquid sulfur market continued to decline. Mainstream prices remained stable, but some local refiners’ auction transactions were at 3,650–3,750 RMB/ton, mostly at the floor price. Downstream buying sentiment was weak. Port holders continued to suspend quotations. Mainstream liquid sulfur prices fell 190 RMB/ton to 3,650–4,140 RMB/ton.
2. Synthetic Ammonia
• In Hubei, mainstream ex-factory prices were 2,270–2,320 RMB/ton (acceptance). Due to previously high prices and weaker surrounding market demand, some ammonia producers faced sales pressure, leading to sharp price declines. Trading sentiment was weak.
• In Shandong, mainstream transactions were 2,350–2,510 RMB/ton, generally stable. Northern Shandong remained relatively strong, but some areas in the peninsula showed weaker activity. Some downstream buyers delayed unloading, and market sentiment was cautious. Northern Shandong may continue to maintain firmness.
3. Phosphate Rock
• Prices remained stable. In Hubei, 28% grade FOB with tax was 980–1,000 RMB/ton; 30% grade around 1,100–1,120 RMB/ton. In Guizhou, 30% grade FOB was 980–1,000 RMB/ton. Transactions were negotiated case by case.
—
Market Price References (negotiated deals common)
• Hubei 55% powder ex-factory: 3,850 RMB/ton
• Hubei 55% granular ex-factory: 3,900–3,950 RMB/ton
• Shandong 55% powder delivered: 3,980–4,000 RMB/ton
• Shandong 58% powder delivered: 4,200–4,250 RMB/ton
• Anhui 55% powder delivered: 3,980–4,000 RMB/ton
• Henan 55% powder delivered: 3,950–4,000 RMB/ton
• Sichuan 55% powder ex-factory: 3,750 RMB/ton
• Jiangsu 55% powder delivered: 3,950–4,000 RMB/ton; 58% powder: 4,150–4,200 RMB/ton
• Yunnan 55% powder ex-factory: 3,700–3,750 RMB/ton; 60% powder: 4,050 RMB/ton
• Northeast (Bayuquan port) 55% powder self-pickup: 3,950–4,000 RMB/ton
—
Factory Price References
• Hubei Ezhong 55% powder: 3,850 RMB/ton, negotiable
• Hubei Chen’ao 55% powder: not quoted
• Hubei Liuguo 55% powder: 3,850 RMB/ton, negotiable
• Hubei Dongsheng 55% powder: 3,850 RMB/ton
• Hubei Xiangyun 55% powder: 3,850 RMB/ton
• Longmang Dadi MAP 55% powder: 3,750 RMB/ton
• Gansu Wengfu MAP 60% powder: 4,280 RMB/ton, negotiable
• Jiyuan Toyota Fertilizer 55% powder: 3,850 RMB/ton
• Henan Jiyuan Wanyang 55% powder: 3,850 RMB/ton
—
Industrial-Grade MAP
The industrial-grade MAP market showed little fluctuation today. The mainstream average price for 73% industrial MAP was around 6,650 RMB/ton. Most factories maintained suspended quotations and contracts, focusing on pending orders. With sulfur prices rebounding to high levels, costs remain supported. Market transactions are negotiated case by case. In the short term, demand-driven purchases are expected, with future trends depending on costs and downstream demand.
• Xinjiang 73% ex-warehouse: 6,950–7,050 RMB/ton
• Yunnan 73% ex-factory: 6,550–6,650 RMB/ton
• Hubei 73% ex-factory: 6,550–6,700 RMB/ton; 72%: 6,500–6,550 RMB/ton
• Sichuan 73% ex-factory: 6,650–6,700 RMB/ton; 72%: 6,500–6,550 RMB/ton
• Guizhou 73% ex-factory: 6,650–6,700 RMB/ton
• Several producers (Sichuan Shikefeng, Longmang Dadi, Hongda, Hubei Xiangyun, Jiashili, Xinyangfeng) suspended quotations, with transactions negotiated individually.
—
Diammonium Phosphate (DAP)
Today, the DAP market remained at high levels with a wait-and-see attitude. Port sulfur prices rebounded, keeping cost pressures elevated. Market participants were cautious, awaiting possible adjustments to guidance prices. Trading activity was limited, with prices temporarily stable at high levels. Focus remains on new guidance prices and sulfur cost changes.
Mainstream Market Price References
• Shandong 64% granular ex-warehouse: 4,550–4,650 RMB/ton; 57%: 4,100–4,200 RMB/ton
• Hebei 64% granular ex-warehouse: 4,550–4,650 RMB/ton; 57%: 4,100–4,200 RMB/ton
• Hubei 64% ex-factory guidance: 4,050–4,100 RMB/ton, actual transactions generally higher
• Jiangsu 64% granular ex-warehouse: 4,400–4,550 RMB/ton
• Heilongjiang (Bayuquan port) 64% self-pickup: 4,800–4,850 RMB/ton; 57%: 4,300–4,400 RMB/ton
• Xinjiang 64% ex-warehouse: 4,700–4,800 RMB/ton
Enterprise Price References
• Hubei Yihua 64%: not quoted
• Hubei Huangmailing 64%: not quoted, negotiable
• Hubei Liuguo (Xinguan) 64%: not quoted
• Hubei Dayukou 64%: not quoted
• Hubei Xingfa 64%: not quoted
• Hubei Xiangyun 64%: not quoted
• Hubei Dongsheng 64%: not quoted, negotiable
• Inner Mongolia Dadi Yuntian: suspended quotations
• Gansu Jinchang DAP 64%: not quoted, fulfilling pre-orders
• Shaanxi Huashan 60% ex-factory: 4,300–4,356 RMB/ton, negotiable; external sales mostly via bidding, with today’s auction transactions at 4,200–4,210 RMB/ton
Morning. Int'l paper shifted attention to Feb yday with AG trading $400-$408. Nola Urea paper somewhat sideways with Jan-Apr valued in $375-$380 range, while Mar phys traded $385. Q1 DAP values moved up $15+/- form day prior.
AG
Dec $388//$398
Jan $402//$412
Feb $402//$408 – traded $400, $408s
Mar $395//$410
Cfr Brazil
Dec $394//$408
Jan $405//$415
Feb $405//$412
Mar $395//$415
Egypt
Jan $415//$455
Feb $412//$450
Nola
Phys: Jan traded $375. Mar $385
Paper:
Dec $355//$360
Jan $373//$380 – traded $379
Feb $375//$382
Mar $377//$385
Apr $375//$380 – traded $380, $375
May $365//$375
Jun $355//$365
UAN Nola
Jan $285//$310
Feb $280//$315
DAP Nola
Phys: Feb traded $620, $625
Dec $625//645
Jan $625//$633 – traded $620, $625, $630
Feb $625//$635
Mar $625//$635
Q1 $625//$635
MAP Brazil
Jan $635//$660
Feb $645//$675
Mar $655//$680
Overall Decline: The World Bank projects a 7% decline in urea prices in 2026, and an additional 9% in 2027, as new production capacity comes online in the Middle East and East Asia. Fitch Ratings also anticipates a decrease in prices for 2026.
A New Kind of Energy Shock – This Time It’s Carbon
In the late 1970s, Europe grappled with an oil shock that forced factories to innovate and conserve energy. Decades later, a different kind of price shock is on the horizon – not from scarce fuel, but from the cost of carbon emissions. On January 1, 2026, the European Union will begin charging importers for the carbon emitted in making products like steel, cement, aluminum, and fertilizer. This Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is poised to reshape global trade much as the oil crises reshaped energy use. It’s a bold experiment in aligning economics with climate goals, and it has fertilizer producers from Amsterdam to Alexandria paying close attention.
The narrative sounds almost like economic history repeating itself. Back in 1979, businesses learned to survive higher oil prices; now they must learn to compete under higher carbon costs. The EU’s move has a clear motive: fix a market failure that has long plagued our atmosphere. To understand the CBAM’s rationale, we first need to revisit a classic economics lesson on externalities – and why unpriced pollution has led us here.
The Unseen Cost of Carbon: Externalities 101
In free markets, prices are signals. But what if a cost isn’t priced at all? That’s the problem with carbon pollution. When a fertilizer plant emits CO₂, it contributes to climate change – incurring real costs to society (from crop damage to health impacts) – yet those costs don’t show up on the company’s balance sheet. Economists call this an externality: a side effect of an economic activity not reflected in market prices[1][2]. In the case of carbon emissions, private producers face lower costs than the true social costs, so they end up producing more emissions than is socially optimal[3]. Put simply, goods with negative externalities (like greenhouse gas emissions) are overproduced when pollution is free[3]. This leads to an inefficient market outcome – a classic market failure.
Over a century ago, British economist Arthur Pigou suggested a remedy: tax the polluter by an amount equal to the harm done[4]. If the fertilizer plant had to pay for each ton of CO₂ emitted, it would produce less, and the market would inch closer to the social optimum. In today’s terms, that’s a carbon price – whether through a tax or a cap-and-trade system – to internalize the externality. Many governments have taken this advice, from carbon taxes in Canada to the EU’s own Emissions Trading System (ETS) launched in 2005. The ETS put a price on carbon for European industries, forcing them to account for the pollution they once emitted for free.
However, there’s a catch when only some countries price carbon. Companies might respond by moving production to places with laxer rules, or importers might just buy from cheaper, high-emission suppliers abroad. This is the carbon leakage problem – and it’s exactly what the EU’s new carbon border fee aims to tackle.
Stemming the Tide of Carbon Leakage
Climate change is a global problem, but climate policies remain local. The EU has steadily raised its carbon price to drive decarbonization at home. As of late 2025, EU carbon permits trade around €90–€100 per ton of CO₂ – a significant cost for industries like steel or fertilizer[5][6]. European manufacturers have worried that if they bear these carbon costs while foreign rivals do not, it’s like playing football with one hand tied behind your back. Companies could relocate factories to countries with no carbon price, or importers could simply buy more from those high-emission regions, undermining the EU’s climate efforts[7][8]. This risk of emissions “leaking” out of Europe can offset domestic emissions cuts by an estimated 13%, according to an OECD study of key industries[9].
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is Europe’s answer to this leakage problem. In essence, CBAM extends the EU’s carbon price to imported goods. The European Commission defines CBAM as a tool to put a fair price on the carbon emitted during production of carbon-intensive goods entering the EU – including fertilizers – in order to encourage cleaner production abroad[10]. In practice, it means if a Russian or Egyptian producer wants to sell ammonia or nitrate fertilizer into Europe, they will have to pay a fee equivalent to the CO₂ emissions embedded in that product, at the same rate European producers pay for carbon emissions under the EU ETS. The goal is to equalize the carbon cost: imported goods will carry a carbon cost “equivalent to the carbon price of domestic production,” so EU firms and foreign firms face a level playing field[8]. By ensuring a price is paid for carbon one way or another, Europe aims to prevent its climate policies from being eroded by global trade flows.
There’s also a strategic nudge involved. By imposing this adjustment, the EU is signaling to the world: if you price carbon or cut emissions at home, your exporters won’t be at a disadvantage – they’ll either pay less CBAM or nothing at all. (Notably, if an exporter has already paid a carbon price in its home country, that amount will be deducted from the CBAM fees[11].) In theory, this creates an incentive for other countries to implement their own carbon pricing or cleaner technologies, rather than lose revenue to Brussels. It’s a carrot-and-stick approach: protect domestic industry, while prodding foreign industries and governments to join the climate effort.
How Does CBAM Work? (In Plain English)
The CBAM will roll out gradually. A transitional phase (2023–2025) is already underway, requiring importers to report the embedded emissions of covered products, but without paying any fee yet[12]. This “learn before you pay” period is a pilot to gather data and iron out methodology. Come January 1, 2026, the definitive system kicks in[13]. Importers of covered goods will need to buy digital “CBAM certificates” equal to the tons of CO₂ in their imports, and surrender them annually[14][15]. The price of these certificates mirrors the EU carbon price (averaged over a recent period)[14]. In effect, if the EU carbon market price is €100 per ton, an importer of 1,000 tons of product that emitted 1 ton CO₂ per ton will owe €100,000 for that year’s imports. Importers must get authorized, track emissions, and report quarterly and annually – a significant new compliance task[5][16].
At first, only a handful of emissions-heavy sectors are affected: iron and steel, aluminum, cement, electricity, hydrogen, and fertilizers[17]. These sectors were chosen for their high carbon intensity and risk of carbon leakage[17]. Over time, more products could be added. By tying the import fee to actual carbon intensity, the system rewards cleaner producers. If a Turkish steel mill or Moroccan ammonia plant has invested in cutting emissions, it will pay less than a dirtier competitor exporting the same product.
Crucially, CBAM is tied to the phase-out of free carbon allowances that EU industries have enjoyed. European steel and fertilizer producers currently receive some free permits under the ETS to help them compete with foreign firms. But these free allowances will be gradually phased out from 2026 onward, reaching zero by 2034. CBAM is meant to fill that gap – protecting against unfair competition not through free pollution rights, but by making foreign producers pay equivalent carbon costs[18][17]. It’s a delicate balancing act to comply with WTO trade rules: the EU insists CBAM is not a tariff, but an environmental measure to equalize costs, since the fee only mirrors what EU companies already pay[8].
For those importing to Europe, the message is clear: know your carbon footprint or pay a hefty default fee. The EU will set default emissions values for each product and country – essentially an emissions benchmark. If a foreign producer can’t verify its actual (and lower) emissions, the default (likely a higher number) will be used[19][20]. This is pushing many exporters to get their emissions audited and improve carbon transparency. Already, importers have been busy gathering data on the carbon content of their supply chains[21]. As one analyst noted, many firms have set up carbon accounting teams working with overseas suppliers to ensure smooth verification[22]. We’re entering an era where a product’s “carbon passport” could be as important as its price tag.
Fertilizer in the Crosshairs: A Carbon-Intensive Industry
Why is the fertilizer industry – particularly nitrogen fertilizers like ammonia, urea, and nitrates – specifically included in the CBAM? The short answer: making fertilizer is extremely energy- and carbon-intensive, and it’s a globally traded commodity. Ammonia, the building block for most nitrogen fertilizers, is made by reacting nitrogen with hydrogen in the century-old Haber-Bosch process. The catch is that today, hydrogen is overwhelmingly made from natural gas or coal, which generates CO₂ as a byproduct. Globally, ammonia production is responsible for roughly 1.8% of CO₂ emissions[23] – about 0.4 gigatons per year – making it one of the largest single-industry emitters. To put it in perspective, that’s nearly as much CO₂ as the entire aviation industry. Fertilizer is food for our fields, but it comes with a hefty carbon footprint.
Most of those emissions come from the hydrogen step. According to the International Energy Agency, a typical modern ammonia plant using natural gas releases about 2.4 tons of CO₂ per ton of ammonia produced[24]. In China, where coal is used for hydrogen, emissions can be closer to 3.9 tons CO₂ per ton[25]. For every ton of nitrogen nutrient, several tons of carbon are vented to the sky. And that’s just the factory side – it doesn’t count nitrous oxide from fertilizer use on farms, which is another climate issue altogether.
Because of this high carbon intensity, fertilizers are exactly the kind of product the EU worries about in carbon leakage terms. Europe consumes a lot of imported ammonia and urea, even as its own producers (like Yara, BASF, and Fertiberia) face carbon costs under the ETS. Without a border adjustment, cheaper high-emission fertilizer could flood the market, undercutting cleaner (but costlier) EU production. Indeed, fertilizer was one of the industries loudly calling for a mechanism to equalize carbon costs. The CBAM answers that call by making importers of ammonia and certain fertilizer products pay for the embedded CO₂.
Consider a concrete example: ammonia. At current EU carbon prices (~€100/ton), an average ammonia import with, say, 2.5 tons CO₂ per ton would face about €250 of carbon cost per ton. If a producer is especially carbon-heavy, the bill is higher. One analysis estimated that U.S.-made ammonia (with a default emission factor of 3.44 tCO₂/ton) could incur around €344 per ton in CBAM fees, whereas ammonia from Egypt (at ~2.07 tCO₂/ton) would face roughly €207 per ton[26]. That €137 difference in carbon cost could easily swing trade flows, making lower-carbon producers more competitive in the EU market. For European fertilizer makers, who typically emit ~1.6 tCO₂ per ton for the most efficient plants[27], the CBAM means foreign rivals will finally have to pay a similar carbon bill when selling in Europe.
A Level Playing Field – and a Push for Cleaner Production
The overarching aim of the CBAM is twofold. First, internalize the cost of carbon globally – essentially extending the carbon pricing principle beyond the EU’s borders. And second, protect domestic industry from unfair competition, while preventing that dreaded carbon leakage. As EU officials put it, CBAM ensures the carbon price of imports is equivalent to that of domestic products so that Europe’s climate objectives “are not undermined” by imported emissions[8]. It’s a defensive climate measure as much as an environmental one.
But European policymakers are also eyeing a bigger prize: incentivizing decarbonization worldwide. If a steel mill in Turkey or a fertilizer plant in Indonesia knows that cleaner production will grant it easier access to the EU market (or a cost advantage there), that’s a powerful motivation to invest in cleaner technology. By leveraging its large single market, the EU hopes to drive a race to the top for industrial decarbonization. In that sense, CBAM is more carrot than stick: pay the fee or cut the carbon – either way, the climate wins.
There is historical precedent for trade measures spurring environmental action. The Montreal Protocol in 1987 famously banned trade in ozone-depleting substances with non-participant countries – a move that strongly encouraged every nation to get on board with phasing out CFCs. Likewise, the EU is betting that a border carbon measure will prod other nations to adopt carbon pricing or tougher climate policies, to ensure their industries remain competitive. Already, seeing the writing on the wall, countries like Canada, Japan, the UK, and even the US are studying their own carbon border adjustment proposals[28]. In the best case, CBAM could be the nudge that leads to more global alignment on carbon costs, reducing the need for the mechanism in the long run. As one World Economic Forum report noted, many jurisdictions are now exploring similar policies, heralding a potential “new era” of carbon-adjusted trade[29][30].
Of course, not everyone is cheering. Some trade partners have labeled CBAM “green protectionism,” seeing it as Europe throwing up a trade barrier under an environmental pretext[31]. Legal challenges in the World Trade Organization are a real possibility. The EU has been at pains to design CBAM to be WTO-compliant (treating imports and domestic goods the same, and focusing strictly on environmental objectives)[8], but debates will continue. Diplomatically, the EU has also set up funding to help developing countries green their industries and adapt to CBAM requirements[32]. The coming years will test whether CBAM is seen as a fair climate measure or a trade weapon – or perhaps both, depending on where you sit.
Case in Point: Fertilizer Producers Adapt (or Struggle)
For fertilizer companies, CBAM’s arrival is prompting strategic rethinks. In Europe, some producers feel vindicated – at last, imports of ammonia and urea from places like Russia, North Africa, and the US will carry a comparable carbon cost, easing pressure on EU manufacturers who must buy EU ETS permits. But it’s not so simple: EU companies also face the gradual removal of free allowances, meaning their own carbon costs are rising in tandem. The idea is that efficient EU plants will manage to cut emissions and outcompete high-carbon imports once everyone’s paying for CO₂. Inefficient producers, whether in Europe or abroad, will be squeezed out unless they clean up or pay up.
Take Agropolychim, one of Bulgaria’s largest fertilizer makers. In 2018, faced with very high natural gas prices (and geopolitical risks of Russian gas supply), Agropolychim made a radical move: it shut down its own ammonia production and started importing ammonia and urea from overseas, while using biomass for heat in its plant[33]. This switch saved costs and even helped it expand fertilizer output, supplying markets like Ukraine[34]. Essentially, they outsourced the carbon-intensive part (ammonia synthesis) to other countries. But as chairman Philippe Rombaut later acknowledged, the strategy “did not account for” the EU’s looming carbon border fee[35]. Now, CBAM will add costs to each ton of imported ammonia based on its carbon intensity[36], upending the economics of Agropolychim’s business model. What looked smart to avoid EU gas and carbon costs is less clever when those costs follow the product across the border.
Starting in 2026, Agropolychim and other European fertilizer producers who rely on imported ammonia will have to pay for the emissions of that ammonia. If their import comes from a country with high CO₂ per ton, the bill could be steep. This has immediate implications: some trade flows might reverse. We might see European companies reconsider domestic ammonia production (especially if they can secure low-carbon hydrogen), or at least seek import sources that are cleaner. There’s talk of more “blue ammonia” – ammonia produced with carbon capture and storage – being shipped to Europe as a way to mitigate CBAM costs[37]. Rombaut anticipates increased blue ammonia supplies, though he questions the economics if natural gas and carbon capture costs remain high[37].
There’s also the complexity of what happens when an EU company imports a carbon-heavy input and then exports the finished product. As of now, CBAM does not offer rebates for exports: if Agropolychim brings in ammonia (paying CBAM on it) to make fertilizer and sells that fertilizer to, say, Australia, they still paid the carbon cost even though the product left the EU. European producers worry this could make them uncompetitive in export markets[38]. “If we want to be competitive outside the EU, we should be able to get the CBAM cost back when we export,” Rombaut argues[39]. Otherwise, he fears, “any factory in Europe will be noncompetitive” in external markets[39]. The EU is aware of this concern but has tread carefully – an export rebate could be seen as a subsidy and raise WTO red flags. As a result, for now EU producers may have to swallow the cost on exports or focus more on serving the domestic European market where everyone pays for carbon.
What about foreign fertilizer exporters? They are staring at a new cost of doing business with Europe. For instance, Egypt is the EU’s second-largest fertilizer supplier (after Russia), and its ammonia production tends to be relatively carbon-intensive. A United Nations report in 2023 flagged Egyptian fertilizer makers as among the most exposed to the CBAM, due to both high trade volumes with Europe and high emissions per ton[40]. Egyptian companies like AlexFert are now tracking the policy closely and looking for ways to adapt[41]. In the short term, they might optimize energy efficiency to shave off some emissions. In the longer term, they are considering investments in lower-carbon technologies (for example, sourcing some hydrogen from renewables or adding carbon capture)[42]. But these are big investments – one executive noted that significant government support would be needed to fund decarbonization in the sector[41].
There’s also a possibility that some producers will seek out alternative markets with no carbon fees. As Nader Hegazy of AlexFert mused, “If we found another market at a premium price, we can go there”[43]. In other words, if selling to Europe becomes too costly, perhaps divert to Latin America, Africa, or elsewhere. But Europe is a major market, and one with deep pockets; abandoning it isn’t a decision taken lightly. Moreover, if the idea of carbon border adjustments spreads to other major economies over the next decade, escaping carbon costs may become increasingly difficult.
For now, many global fertilizer suppliers are taking a pragmatic approach: comply and adapt. They are setting up data systems to precisely measure the carbon intensity of their products, hiring verifiers, and exploring cleaner process tweaks. Those who can certify a lower footprint than the default will do so to reduce the CBAM charges. Some are accelerating pilot projects for green ammonia, using renewable electricity to make hydrogen. While green ammonia is still far more expensive (and not yet available at scale), it completely eliminates CO₂ emissions from production. If produced at scale, green ammonia could virtually sidestep CBAM costs (its emissions are near zero, aside from any transport), making it economically attractive under a high carbon price[44][45]. The EU is, in fact, funding innovation in this area: programs like the Innovation Fund are channeling billions of euros into first-of-a-kind clean tech for industries including ammonia[46].
Strategic Responses: How Fertilizer Businesses Can Play to Win
Facing this new landscape, what should fertilizer industry professionals and related businesses do? Here are several strategic responses emerging as CBAM comes into force:
Reduce Emissions at the Source: The most straightforward (if challenging) response is to cut the carbon intensity of production. This can mean investing in green ammonia plants powered by renewable hydrogen, or retrofitting existing facilities for blue ammonia with carbon capture. Each ton of CO₂ shaved off production is one less ton to pay for at the border. Companies like Norway’s Yara have already piloted electrolyzer-based ammonia production, aiming to supply “CBAM-free” fertilizers in the future. Early movers in decarbonization will gain a competitive edge as carbon prices rise[47][48], especially if by the 2030s CBAM effectively forces a choice: go green or lose access to key markets.
Strengthen Carbon Reporting and Verification: Data is king under the CBAM. Firms that know their numbers and can prove them will fare better. This means implementing robust monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) systems for emissions. Several fertilizer importers have set up dedicated carbon accounting teams already[22]. By conducting third-party verified life-cycle assessments of their products, companies can ensure they aren’t overpaying due to inflated default values. In some cases, accurate data could reveal that a producer’s actual emissions are lower than the conservative defaults, cutting the fee significantly. Investing in digital tools to trace carbon through the supply chain – from natural gas input to final fertilizer output – will become a standard business practice.
Optimize Supply Chains: Sourcing decisions might shift based on carbon intensity. A fertilizer trader in Europe might choose to buy from a plant in Malaysia that runs on cleaner gas or uses some carbon capture, over a slightly cheaper but higher-emission plant elsewhere. Likewise, manufacturers can prioritize lower-carbon inputs. If you’re blending fertilizer or formulating products, using intermediates (like ammonia, nitric acid, etc.) that have a smaller carbon footprint can reduce the CBAM liability on the finished product. We may see new “green premium” supply chains emerge, where producers with sustainability certifications find favored status among buyers subject to carbon costs. Additionally, some companies might relocate parts of their production chain: for example, performing the most energy-intensive steps in regions with abundant renewable energy to create semi-finished products, which then can be shipped to Europe with minimal carbon fees.
Financial Planning and Carbon Cost Pass-through: From a business perspective, the CBAM cost needs to be factored into pricing and contracts. Companies should engage in scenario planning – what does our margin look like if carbon is €100/ton? €150/ton? Can we pass the cost to customers (like farmers), or do we need to absorb it by improving efficiency? Internal carbon pricing (shadow pricing carbon in investment decisions) can help firms prepare for these costs[49][50]. Hedging strategies might even develop (e.g. financial instruments to lock in future carbon prices or currency adjustments). The CBAM certificates’ price is tied to the volatile ETS market[5][6], so importers face a new kind of commodity risk – managing that will be a part of the game.
Engage in Policy and Alliances: Given the novelty of CBAM, there are still details being ironed out (benchmark values, scope of indirect emissions, potential sector additions, etc.[51]). Companies and industry groups should remain actively engaged with policymakers. For instance, fertilizer industry associations in Europe will be closely watching how the EU handles indirect emissions (like CO₂ from the electricity used in production) which are set to be included after the transition period for sectors like fertilizers[12]. Internationally, exporters may lobby their own governments to implement carbon pricing or strike climate agreements with the EU to avoid double costs. Collaborative efforts, such as standardizing carbon accounting or developing green product standards, can help reduce friction. The EU is offering technical assistance to developing countries to adapt – companies can encourage their governments to take advantage of that[32].
Monitor Competitors and Market Shifts: Finally, businesses should keep a keen eye on how trade flows adjust. If certain exporters drop out of the EU market due to CBAM, others might fill the void. We might see, for example, an increase in fertilizers imported from countries that have low-carbon energy (say, a future “green ammonia hub” country) while high-carbon suppliers pivot elsewhere. Companies that anticipate these shifts can secure new partnerships or markets proactively. Conversely, if you’re a domestic EU producer, you might find new opportunities as imports realign – but also new competition from any foreign producers who successfully go green and capitalize on their low-carbon status.
Conclusion: Turning Point for Fertilizer and Climate Economics
The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism marks a turning point where climate policy and trade policy decisively intersect. For the fertilizer industry, it’s the start of a new era reminiscent of a narrative Paul Krugman once evoked: a throwback to bold measures of the past, refashioned for today’s challenges. In 1979, expensive oil forced companies to get smarter about energy. In 2026 and beyond, a price on carbon at the border will force companies to get smarter about emissions.
For Europe, CBAM is a grand experiment in reshaping incentives: can a region acting alone tip the scales globally by leveraging its market power? For businesses, it’s a signal that carbon efficiency will be key to competitiveness. As one CBAM specialist noted, the EU’s own cap-and-trade system already drove companies to invest billions in decarbonization or else rethink their operations[47]. Now, that dynamic is set to play out on the global stage. By the 2030s, fertilizer producers (and other heavy industries) will likely face a stark choice: innovate and cut emissions, or risk being priced out of major markets[47][48].
In the fertilizer world, the pieces are moving. European importers are stockpiling product before the new rules bite[52]. Traders are poring over emissions spreadsheets. Engineers are dusting off plans for carbon capture and electrolyzers. It’s a compelling mix of narrative and economic insight: the story of a global industry adapting to a long-unaccounted cost. The externality of carbon is finally getting internalized, and in doing so, it’s changing how business is done. Fertilizer might not usually make for front-page news, but in the saga of climate action and trade, it’s taking a starring role. As Europe throws this climate party (channeling 1979’s spirit with a 2020s twist), fertilizer companies around the world will need to join in – by cleaning up their act – if they don’t want to miss out on the celebration.
Sources: European Commission; S&P Global[33][10]; IMF[1][3]; World Economic Forum[13][31]; Royal Society[23]; IEA/World Economic Forum[24]; Discovery Alert (Ammonia trade analysis)[26][44]; UN report via S&P Global[40].
[1] [2] [3] [4] Externalities: Prices Do Not Capture All Costs
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The sulfur market in the port today is showing signs of weakness. During the morning session, there was a significant disparity in prices between buyers and sellers, and no substantial transactions were concluded. Downstream inquiries generally focused on prices below 3,900 yuan/ton, while sellers maintained their prices around 4,000 yuan/ton. A meeting related to fertilizer supply security held in the morning clearly stated that, in order to ensure the stable supply and pricing of fertilizers, domestically produced sulfur must maintain a reasonable profit margin, and prices should not be significantly increased. Due to this policy guidance, market participants have adopted a wait-and-see stance. Attention will be focused on the transaction situation and changes in trading atmosphere in the afternoon. As of the time of writing, the reference price for granular sulfur in the Yangtze River market is around 3,850-4,000 yuan/ ton, down from the previous working day’s low level. ⬇️100 yuan/ton.